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A. TABLE OF AUTHORITY 
CASES P A G E 
Holm v. Smilowitz 840 P.2nd 159 [Utah App. 1992] 
3 
B. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to UTAH JUDICIAL CODE: Pages 399-401 
[78-3-13.5] Counties joining the court system, 
[78-3-4] Jurisdiction 
(4) "Appeals from the final orders, judgements, and 
decrees of the district court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-
3. 
See also [78-2-2(1)]. 
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c. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The Appellant requests the Court of Appeals consider the 
following issues: 
a. Equity in the law. 
1. Pursuant to the 1964 Discrimination Act; passed by congress 
with a provision that no discrimination in terms of gender, or sex 
can exist in any walk of life, in jobs, in promotions, even in the 
attendance of private clubs. The lower Court has violated this 
provision of the law by granting to the Appellee (the female) during 
the interim, and in it's final decrees, all of the meaning parts of 
the estate in question and all of the estate labeled "inheritance". 
The lower Court also concluded the gifts and stolen money from the 
estate that were "inheritance" on the here say of counsel(female). 
Then the Court garnished the wages of the Appellant(male) and 
refused the Appellant a hearing to collect the money owed to him by 
the female. The Court refused a hearing to pursue the question of 
coercion and refused to acknowledge the illness and economic rape 
of the male. 
5 
2* It is therefore just and proper that this matter be set for 
trial and the instruction to the lower Court should be to divide in 
the estate in half according to the law passed by congress in 1964, 
and the laws of Utah, and to order that an accountant to set the 
value of "half11 as the Appellee has very serious problems with that 
fraction. 
3. If the Court of Appeals rules, and grants that the female 
ought to have the bulk of the estate, and the estate labeled 
"inheritance" then, it would be just that each party have an equal 
retirement income. The Court should order that each party shall 
have his or her retirement and to rescind the QUALIFIED DOMESTIC 
ORDER. The Court may also order that the equity in the four-
plex($70,000) by granted to Appellant to compensate the loss of 
half of his retirement, about $70,000. 
b. The theft of assets via the instructions given the 
Appellee by her counsel. 
1. The Appellant requests that all bank accounts jointly owned or 
individually owened in the name of the Appellant or the of the 
Appellee be divided in half, and that an accountant be set by the 
Court and ordered to effect this division on the day of the divorce 
Oct. 10 1992. 
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c. The issue of the estate and it's value and extent. 
1. The Appellant requests that the value of all assets as of Oct. 
10 1992 of the Appellant and the Appellee be appraised by the 
accounting firm, operated by Sidney Gilbert(a previosly mutually 
accepted accountant) for the purpose of the equal division of the 
said property and that the costs of this appraisal are to be 
equally divided. 
d. The issue of fraud on the part of counsel by coercion. 
1. At the time the divorce was filed the attorney, Ms. Brown, was 
informed that the Appellant was under extreme coercion and did not 
feel he was able to make a proper decision at that time. Instead of 
delaying the matter and refusing to proceed she fabricated false 
information and had the Appellant sign this to cover her backside. 
This was a criminal act to take advantage of the Appellant in his 
known state of mind. The Appellant requests the Court to order Ms. 
Brown, counsel for the Appellee, to return her attorney fees to the 
estate (half to the Appellee and half to the Appellant). 
e. The issue of relief for the lower courts failure to grant 
a hearing. 
1. The Appellant requests the court to grant that all of the 
money collected from the voice-mail and pager leases by the "bait 
and switch11 fraud perpetrated by Ms. Brown be returned to the 
Appellant. That is; all of the money in his name from Oct. 10, 1992 
to the present ($195 + $350)/ month and that the $925 of attorneys 
fees to collect this be granted the Appellant as well. The 
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Appellant also requests that Ms. Brown be ordered by the Court to 
clear the Appellants name of the debt on the home granted to the 
Appellee, and to file a law suit free of charge, or whatever it 
takes to free the Appellant of this credit problem. It is also 
further requested that the Court order the Success Tax firm of 
Provo, the firm that has completed the tax forms for the estate for 
years, determine the value of the tax deduction of the interest 
paid on the home and award that tax deduction to the Appellant. 
8 
D, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The Constitution of the United States of America provides the 
following rights: 
a* The right to a speedy trial. 
b. The right to have counsel, 
c. The right to a hearing. 
d. The right to appeal. 
e. The right to equity in the law. 
f. The right to own property. 
The provision by the 1964 Sex Disrimination Act to eliminate 
gender bias in all parts of society is very germain to this case. 
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E. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Comes now, the Appellant's Statement Of The Case in Brief• 
1. The Court hearing this matter was in the mind set that; all 
men seeking a divorce have left there spouse destitute, that they 
have taken every liquid asset of the estate and are before the 
court to be taught the lesson that male roll is to provide. The 
Court has dealt with many such cases and the mechanism for 
confiscation of the male's estate and income were all primed to be 
put in place. The extreme gender bias of the court from past 
experience is the main cause of this appeal. Because of this bias 
the court was unable and unwilling to consider the needs of the 
male in this action. 
2. The Court's position seemed to be if the male filed then he 
should loose his lives work and the female should have his estate. 
The roving eye of the male appears to the Court to dictate this 
policy. It never occurred to the Court that the male was leaving 
because the female had another she loved, and that the cause of 
this action is the hate, the greed and the defiance by the female. 
It is always assumed that there is no reason that a man should ever 
leave a woman only the reverse. 
3. The thought that a professional person could come to the court 
with good cause for divorce, and that the natural provider had 
already provided for every need of the female was not 
comprehendible to this Court. Nor did the Court at any time 
consider that the female might have an estate of her own, that she 
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needed no providing for, and that as a result of this extensive 
estate, had no need of any of the joint estate income nor the wages 
of the male to defend herself, nor to provide for herself during 
the needless-elongated proceedings of this matter* Commissioner 
Maetani consistently denied the Appellant the opportunity to 
explain this or any other matter. It was all as water off a ducks 
back when the Court was forced to give the Appellant audience. 
The Court had it's mind set as concrete; all mixed up and 
very permanently set. Rubber stamping everything presented to the 
court by the female lawyer is much simpler than listening and 
getting at the truth by asking pointed questions. The greater the 
backlog of cases the greater the use of the rubber stamp. 
4. Consider the Appellee's own estate. She had over $88/month in 
low interest income and $150/month from the sale of some property 
and more than $30,000 in several secret bank accounts. If she had 
continued to work, only a few hours per month these incomes would 
have sustained her living without touching her savings. At the time 
of the separation she was paying no mortgage and had worked up 
until she received orders from her attorney not work until the 
divorce was final, so as to play out the lie of the unskilled 
housewife with no assets. Her only expense was utilities, food and 
travel for one person. The greatest joy in her life, during the 32 
year marriage, was to squirrel away several hundred dollars a month 
in her secret accounts. The Appellee paid for nothing from her 
income as per the instructions from her brother, who runs her life, 
at considerable cost to her. She paid for no food, no clothing for 
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herself, no family vacations only her separate vacations, no 
emergency, no expense of any kind was paid from her estate. To rub 
salt into the sore spot she paid her tithing from the wages of the 
Appellant. So to make sure she had plenty of money to squirrel away 
the Appellant assigned to her the income from an pager/voice male 
lease which was very close to $1,000/ month without any input from 
the Court. She also had an additional $400/ month income from the 
"jointly" owned four-plex. This provision was 88 + 150 + 195 + 92.5 
+ 700 + 400 or $1,625.50 / month non-working income. Without a 
mortgage payment this left her at least $800/month to squirrel 
away. At this point the take home pay of the Appellant was $1,800 
/ month in wages. She was also provided with the best 
transportation all paid for, to tote this money to her secret 
accounts. In addition to that she was provided with access to a 
joint account with over $6,000 in it. The Appellant's plan was to 
pay any unpaid bills and obtain counsel, and split the rest. The 
Appellee's plan was to take everything of value and she did. She 
stole his skis and boots, wheels for his truck, a motor he had 
overhauled, his rototiller and many other personal items were 
taken, if not for money, then for spite as well as bank accounts. 
5. Had the Court recognized the theft of this money and the other 
items, that alone would have justified deigning alimony. If she had 
$6,000 from a joint account she certainly did not need alimony 
during the litigation. Commissioner Maetani in granting alimony has 
set a new record in the Courts. For the Commissioner to say that a 
fair trial could follow with the Appellant having to work and live 
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on $900/month with no access to savings and the Appellee to sit 
home and have $2,525.50/month and have access to all of her vast 
estate of stolen money, shows the extreme gender bias of the Court* 
For one professional teacher to pay another professional teacher 
alimony under these conditions without children involved, has to be 
a first in gender bias. Utah has always been behind in adjusting to 
the trends. Some states have very wisely outlawed alimony with 
women making up 47 % of the work force, alimony is a gender biased 
law. It is just and proper that this Court of Appeals consider the 
return of these unjustified payments ($4,042) and the return of the 
Appellants half of the joint accounts($3,000). 
6. The Appellee has made good use of her idle time calling and 
visiting the children and friends and carefully portraying the 
Appellant as a the worst person on the face of this earth. She was 
successful in her slander in some cases since there are members of 
Appellant's family that refuse a written invitation to attend the 
home of the Appellant. She went to the campus where the Appellant 
works and interfered with work, and tried to get his friends 
to end their friendship by the use of slander. She called the 
Bishop of the LDS Church and was able to convince him that the 
Appellant should not have a temple recommend and the Bishop 
followed her orders and withdrew that recommend. The day before the 
Appellant was to marry in the temple she called the temple and got 
them to cancel the marriage via her slander. She has openly stated 
her goal in life is to have the Appellant live out his life without 
one person to care if he lives or dies and for him to do it in 
abject poverty. 
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7. To facilitate the goal to have the Appellant die in poverty 
the Appellee secured the roost expensive counsel with the very best 
in delay tactics. This woman is totally incapable of telling the 
truth and is also an excellent con artist. This woman was judge, 
jury and counsel for both parties. She would stand up in court and 
outline what the matter was, and her interpretation of the law 
concerning it, and what the Court aught to do and say concerning 
the matter, and demand that the court grant her request. At that 
point the parties might as well have left the court. She had 
consulted with the Commissioner prior to coming to court and they 
had set what was to happen. Everything was cut and dried in 
conspiracy long before court was held. 
8. She devised a temporary document that gave her client total 
control over all of the assets of the marriage and one that granted 
her client an additional $900/raonth from the salary of the 
Appellant. Any extended period would have left the Appellant unable 
to defend himself in court, so the Appellant wouldn't sign until 
she promised that this would be in effect for one month only, and 
that the matter was set for trial with the appropriate waiver. She 
maintained, if the Appellant wanted a speedy divorce he would have 
to sign, and that this must be signed right now since court was 
about to quit for the day, and that there would be weeks of delay 
if the Appellant didn't sign right now, and that this action was 
just the court's normal procedure. At this time the Appellant 
didn't know the true character of this con artist. The truth of the 
matter is; that once property has been assigned to a female via a 
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female lawyer the male has no chance of ever regaining that 
property in Commissioner Maetani's Court. 
9. The Appellant's counsel was involved as a public defender and 
was unprepared to counsel or defend the Appellant and told him so, 
at the time. However, she said to go ahead and sign it and she 
promised to go to trial better prepared. Counsel confirmed that at 
the trial a complete accounting of the estate would be made and 
that since she had filed a waiver and set the matter for trial and 
that the trial was only a few weeks away and at that time according 
to the law the total assets of the marriage would be divided in 
half, including all of the income from the investments and the real 
estate. The truth was that neither counsel had set the matter for 
trial nor did they ever have any intention of setting this matter 
for trial. This was a ripe plumb ready to be plucked, and they were 
not about to let this one get away. The Appellant's counsel was 
female and by her gender wanted the female to get the estate. They 
wanted this before the courts as many years as possible and they 
were very successful. This matter was started in March of 1992 and 
is now one year and a half old and we are no closer to a 
satisfactory settlement now than we were in March of 1992. 
10. A non-appealable-satisfactory settlement to both parties of 
this matter is obtained by following the guild lines given in the 
law. If both parties were to come to the Court or an arbitrator 
with a list of the assets of the marriage in descending order of 
value(the most valuable first) with an indication of those items 
each party would like to have, the divorce would be very simple in 
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the law. Both parties must agree as to the value of the items or 
this would be resolved by an appraisal that each pays half to 
obtain. The woman would be granted first choice since women are 
highly favored by the courts. If one party did not indicate the he 
or she wanted that item, then that choice would be voided by the 
failure to act. Any liquid asset would then serve to set an exact 
half to each according to the guild lines of the law. The Appellant 
set an appointment with a mutual friend, an accountant to act as an 
arbitrator. The Appellee failed to make that appointment. She much 
preferred to litigate than to arbitrate. With her counsel in total 
control it would be foolish for her to arbitrate. Why take half 
according to the law when you can get it all by coercion and fraud? 
11. Next the con artist had her client empty the joint accounts 
and the set a date whereby only the empty accounts and the Key bank 
account, in the Appellants name, were to be frozen. All of her 
clients accounts with the stolen money in them, were to be left 
open and labeled as "inheritance money". This left the Appellee 
with a $2,000/month to squirrel away for seven months and is now 
living on this $14,000 of stolen money, plus the money stolen from 
the leases after the divorce. 
12. The problem with most thefts is there are usually many 
mistakes. Somehow the conspiracy failed and the Appellee was 
closing out accounts after the date set by the con artist and 
Commissioner Maetani. At this point Judge Park signed an Order to 
Show Cause and the matter was set for hearing. Bank statements were 
presented to the Court showing the closing of "frozen" accounts. 
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This proved an embarrassment but Commissioner Maetani told the con 
artist that, he expected the her to respect the frozen nature of 
these accounts and that was the end of the matter. In other words 
a slap on the wrist(naughty girl) for grand theft if your a well 
liked female lawyer in his court* 
13. After a few months of delay, the Appellant was unable to keep 
up with the $2,000/month scam and his wages were garnisheed. At 
this point the Appellant asked the Court for a divorce and a trial 
for a property settlement later. The Appellant and the Appellee 
both wanted this to take place only the con artist and the Court 
wanted this not to occur. A trial may be appealed but if a 
signature is obtained, then it is almost impossible to appeal, as 
indicated to the Appellant, by Frederick Jackman who refused to 
take this case because the chance of winning was small according to 
Jackman. The granting of this divorce at this time was a very 
necessary relief to the emotionally charged battle of the past 
months. Not to grant this on the basis that to do so would relieve 
the coercion was clearly malfeasance of office on the part of the 
court. The Courts main function is to serve, and to grant relief 
from oppression not to foster and sustain oppression and cruel and 
unusual punishment. We pay taxes for the judges to relieve not to 
coerce. In the Courts own words to grant such a request would 
remove the "incentive to settle". This brings the court to the 
conclusion that extended delays foster fewer successful appeals, 
which is great for the court, but denies the basic constitutional 
right to a speedy trial to the parties. 
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14. As a result of the weakened physical condition and the 
needless-prolonged-camping-out living conditions imposed by the 
Court on the Appellant, the Appellant contracted tick fever, a 
debilitating disease that attaches the liver. The Appellant 
determined that it was best to sign anything and get this matter 
before a court of law, rather than this three ring circus that 
wasn't funny or entertaining. It was clear that the conspiracy to 
break the male to a point where he would sign anything had been 
very successful. 
15. When the con artist learned that the Appellant was ill and was 
signing anything, she didn't keep up with the concessions. This is 
why the divorce indicates that each party shall pay their own court 
costs in one place, and in another grants the con artist $1,000. 
This is also why in one place it indicates that the Appellee shall 
pay all of the debts on the home granted to her and in another that 
the Appellants savings shall be used for that. 
16. Since the Appellee had been very successful in hiding her 
estate from the Court by calling it "inherited" money and since the 
Court accepted the here say of Ms. Brown, and since playacting the 
part of the poor unskilled housewife had been done so well the 
Appellant demanded that the pager-voice-mail leases having his name 
on them were to be his from October 1992 until they ran out. This 
amounts to half of the voice-mail lease or $350 and $195(his pager 
lease) each month from the month of October of 1992 until the lease 
ran out. The Appellee was to have $350(her half) and $97.5(her 
pager lease). The con artist running true to form, made up a number 
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$395(there is no lease with this nuinber on it and she has copies of 
all leases and they are filed with the court) and used that plus 
the $195(his pager lease) and wrote into the divorce these two 
should be split and failed to mention the $97.5(her pager lease) 
completely. This is the con artists bait and switch technique. The 
parties agree to something verbally she writes something up that 
sounds like the verbal agreement but grants to her client the bulk 
of the amount. If the opponent is trusting and signs, all she has 
to do is claim that this wasn't the case and the signed agreement 
stands up in any court. This was very acceptable procedure in 
Commissioner Maetani's court. This wasn't the end she then 
instructed her client not to pay anything. The plan was to take the 
matter before Commissioner Maetani and with her total control have 
even this granted to the Appellee as well. The Appellant filed a 
motion to have the payment of these funds confiscated from the 
Appellee's vast bank accounts and was refused a hearing to do so. 
The Appellant then secured the services of Frederick Jackman and 
spent $925 in fees and has no way of recovering those fees, accept 
through this Court, since the Commissioner refuses to hear the 
matter. 
17. When the con artist was told by the Appellant he was being 
coerced, she then put a statement in the Stipulation that no such 
coercion was taking place, since she knew it would be signed. This 
statement was there to cover her back side. She also added one more 
statement she knew was not true, that was that the Appellant had 
consulted an attorney before signing her lies. 
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18. Commissioner Maetani knew this economic rape was a result of 
coercion. He was and is today a party to that coercion. So he 
arranged a swearing in, a statement to cover his back side. His 
thinking was that no court would hear an appeal where the male had 
stated that the divorce was fair. The Appellant knew there was no 
way the divorce would be signed, there was no way to get matter 
before a legitimate court, unless he said it was fair. Had the 
Appellant told the commissioner the things contained in this appeal 
the matter would gone back to the delay mode. If the Appellant 
wanted a divorce in this century, it was mandatory to secure the 
Commissioner's backside. 
19. At this point the economic rape was complete except for one 
item. The con artist was to use the Appellant's savings to pay the 
back payments, in the month of October, on the home granted to the 
Appellee. A few days before the divorce the Appellant gave the con 
artist $14,000 from his savings. However being an excellent con 
artist she delayed making the settlement with the Lomas Mortgage 
until the beginning of 1993. This delay of several months enabled 
the con artist's client to have the interest deduction of $3,500. 
In addition she arranged to have the Appellant's name on the 
mortgage so that he is unable to get credit since the credit report 
shows his home, his truck, and the home granted to the Appellee all 
as his debt as by the fraudulent divorce. It is proper and just 
that the Appellee pay the Appellant this tax deduction obtained by 
fraud, and pay the cost of removing the name of the Appellant from 
the mortgage on the home granted to the Appellee by the fraudulent 
divorce. 
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F, SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The summary of the Argument is as follows; 
That: 
a* Commissioner Maetani has failed to grant the Appellant 
his constitutional right to a hearing on critical issues* 
b. There is a case of president cited in the Motion 
For Summary Disposition, where the Court Of Appeals has reversed 
the lower Courts decision for failure to grant the fundamental 
right to a hearing. 
c. The signature of the Appellant effecting this 
economic rape, was obtained under the condition of ill health, and 
by economic and verbal coercion. 
d. The estate of the couple was never declared to 
the courts in any form. 
e. The assets of the Appellee should be declared by 
this Court Of Appeals, as joint property since no legal evidence 
was or is now presented to the contrary. 
f. That the disparity of the division of property clearly 
shows the gender bias of the Court. The Court was approached 
several times to end this economic rape, but failed to consider the 
needs of the male because of it's extreme gender bias. 
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G. ARGUMENT OF THE CASE 
The Argument of this case is as follows; 
That: 
a. Because of the gender bias of the Court and the personal 
affinity for the counsel of the Appellee the Court failed, to hear 
the Appellant's case concerning his following needs; 
1. The need for reasonable living conditions. 
2. The need to reconsider the interim document. 
3. The need to grant the Appellant access to funds for 
appropriate counsel. 
4. The need to consider the health and ability to make 
critical decisions without counsel. 
5. The need to be able to collect money owed to the 
Appellant by the Appellee according to the fraudulent divorce. 
6. The need to protect the credit rating and the 
ability to function in society. 
b. In the case of Holm v. Smilowitz the decision of the 
lower Court was reversed since the Commissioner involved did not 
grant a hearing and acted on here say. This is exactly the mode of 
operation of Commissioner Maetani in this matter. 
c. In spite of repeated attempts on the part of the 
Appellant the Court refused to allow the Appellant to live in his 
own apartment. As a result of the coercion and bad living 
conditions, the Appellant became ill and despondent to the point 
that he signed any document, and said anything, to get this matter 
before a legitimate court. 
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d. The fact that the Court signed a document with self 
contradictions granting the Appellee the Appellant's half of the 
estate, shows the rubber stamping nature of the Court. It also 
shows the Court is not interested in a just decision, only in a 
decision that is hard to appeal. The Court required no appraisal of 
real estate or bank account balance of the Appellee, be set in 
the Stipulation nor the divorce. The fact that there could have 
been $1,000,000 in any of the accounts granted under this Courts 
adjudication shows the complete disregard for the welfare of the 
male by this Court of bias. 
e. The Court erred in not requiring the Appellee to prove 
the money held in her estate was "inherited". To accept carte blank 
the here say evidence of her counsel over the objections of the 
Appellant was very biased procedure. Every penny of the Appellant's 
account and his wages and his retirement and any other item of 
value was sought out like a bear seeking honey, and declared before 
the Court in full. 
f. The four-plex in question will become a very good 
retirement income. When the refinancing is complete and the 
mortgage is paid off, the income will continue to rise with 
inflation. The Appellee would have under the fraudulent divorce 
her Social Security, her retirement from teaching, and half of the 
Appellants retirement and the income from the four-plex at the 
point where the mortgage is all paid off.(about $20,000/year at 
retirement). Why should the female have all of the meaningful 
assets of this estate? Why should every manner of coercion and 
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fraud be rewarded in this disproportionate manner? It is very 
unfair for the female to have the home, the four-plex, the pager-
voice-mail leases, the bank accounts and the male to have some 
minor investments. It is very unfair for the female to have her 
retirement and half of that of the Appellant. It is fair that the 
valuable items of the estate be divided equally according to the 
law and equity. The male can not recover from this inequity in the 
few remaining years he has to work. The courts must not let the 
politics of the day obscure the needs of the male in retirement. 
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H. CONCLUSION 
The conclusion of this matter is when men are given 
power, it is their nature and disposition to abuse that power. To 
render decisions based on who is involved, and completely ignore 
needs of the parties or any of the facts of the case. This has been 
repeated over and over again in history. The reason we have a 
constitution holding sacred certain rights, such as a speedy trial 
and the right to a jury trial, and the right to a hearing is; that 
the English had based their decisions on the class of the citizen 
and not on the facts. The violation of these rights gave birth to 
civil rights. Frederick Jackman has said; "there is no law in 
divorce court1*. He is such a successful lawyer that he has a 
building named after him, and takes only the cases he is certain of 
winning. 
Compare the divorce of Mantz v. Mantz with this case. 
Two teachers the same age of the parties of this litigation, and 
having the same estate, a car, a truck, two houses and investments 
and bank accounts. The judge told the parties on the opening day 
that there would be no alimony since both were college graduates. 
The estate was split in half and in forty five days and the healing 
process had already begun. The total cost was $750. The legal costs 
of this case are now about a factor of ten higher than Mantz v. 
Mantz. There can be no healing in a divorce that goes on for years 
and years, there is only complete polarization in the extended 
family. If reasonal a judication is in one city and economic rape in 
an other, then Mr. Jackman is right, there is no law in divorce 
court. 
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I. MANUAL SIGNATURE 
This is to certify that without the help of an attorney I 
Robert H. Peterson, the Appellant, did prepare this document to the 
very best of my limited ability, I would have much prefered to 
teach Calculus, Physics and Electronics and to have had an attorney 
prepare this document. I did seek earnestly to submit this document 
free of error, with the help of an attorney. No attorney that 
reviewed the case would take this case. 
Dated this the 23rd day of October 1993. 
ROBERT H. PETERSON 
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J. SERVICE CERTIFICATE 
D&M1492 I ROBERT H. PETERSON certify that on 
I served two copies of the attached brief upon Michael D. Esplin of 
43 East 200 North Provo, Utah counsel, for the Appellee, in this 
natter by personally serving it upon him at the the following 
address. 
43 East 200 North 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Dated this day the % & . of October 1993. 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
•OOOoo-
Robert H. Peterson BRIEF 
Plaintiff and Appellant, Addendum 
V. 
Virginia T. Peterson Court of Appeals 
Defendant and Appellee, Case # 930437-CA 
Michael D. Esplin Robert H. Peterson 
Attorney for Appellee Appellant (pro-se) 
43 East 200 North 1373 East 400 South 
Provo, Utah 84601 Springville, Ut. 84663 
Tel. (801) 373-4912 Tel. (801) 489-4790 
FILED 
OCT 2 7 1993 
COURT OF APPEALS 

Marilyn Moody Brown #4803 
ROBINSON, SEILER, GLAZIER & BROWN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
80 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 1266 
Provo, UT 84603-1266 
Telephone: (801) 375-1920 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT H. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 924400839 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for hearing 
on the 8th day of October, 1992, Commissioner Howard H. 
Maetani presiding. The Plaintiff appeared in person and was 
representing himself. The Defendant did not appear in person 
but was represented by MARILYN MOODY BROWN of Robinson, 
Seiler, Glazier and Brown. The Court having heard the 
testimony introduced on behalf of the Plaintiff and being 
fully advised in the premises, and having heretofore entered 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions, now upon motion of 
Plaintiff, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The bonds of matrimony and the marriage contract 
heretofore existing by and between the Plaintiff and Defendant 
be, and the same are hereby dissolved, and the Plaintiff is 
hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from Defendant on the 
grounds of irreconcilable differences, said Decree to become 
absolute and final upon entry by the Court in the Register of 
Actions. 
2. Plaintiff is a bona fide resident of Utah County, 
State of Utah, and has been for three months immediately prior 
to the filing of this action. 
3. Plaintiff and Defendant were married on December 23, 
1959, at St. George, Utah, and are presently married. 
4. There have been five children born as issue of this 
marriage. All of said children have reached the age of 
majority. 
5. Each party waives and forever relinquishes any and 
all claims he or she may have to alimony from the other party 
or to any share of the assets of other party, except as herein 
expressly provided. 
6. Defendant is awarded the right, title, and interest 
in and to the real property located at 4 37 South 800 East, 
Orem, Utah, and the four-plex located at 789 East 1400 South, 
Orem, Utah. Defendant hereby accepts and assumes exclusive 
responsibility for any and all debts and obligations arising 
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out of the purchase and ownership of said real property. 
Plaintiff will execute a Quit Claim Deed transferring all his 
right, title, and interest in and to said real property to 
Defendant. 
7. The obligations owing on the home for which 
Defendant will be responsible will include the amount owing 
to Sid Gilbert, Lomas and Nettleton (mortgage), Mardell Topham 
(appraiser), and D. David Lambert (attorney). 
8. The Defendant is awarded the Key Bank Account 
(749072179) and will pay the following obligations from the 
money in that account: Sid Gilbert ($300.00), Mardell Topham 
($650.00), David Lambert ($1,000.00), Marilyn Moody Brown 
($1,000.00), and Lomas and Nettleton. Any amount in the 
account in excess of the obligations named in this paragraph 
shall be given to Plaintiff. 
9. The parties acquired personal property. Said 
personal property is divided as follows: 
A. To the Plaintiff: 1982 truck, 1980 motorcycle, 
small motorcycle, dune buggy, violin, keyboard, travel 
trailer, and tools. 
B. To the Defendant: 1983 car, 6 foot by 12 foot 
utility trailer, two inflatable boats, tools (pipe bender), 
lawnmower, rototiller, antique dinette set, tv, VCR, couch, 
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two recliners, piano, sewing machine, 4 beds, washer and 
dryer, bedroom set, food storage, freezer, computer, two 
desks, filing cabinets, and microwave oven. 
C. The remaining personal property is awarded as 
it has already been divided between the parties. 
10. The Plaintiff acquired a retirement and/or a pension 
plan through his place of employment. The Defendant will 
receive one-half (1/2) of all amounts that were accumulated 
during the marriage. The- Court will enter a Qualified 
Domestic Relations Order effectuating this provision. 
11. The Defendant will receive the home and the Key Bank 
Account as indicated previously in this document in lieu of 
any alimony. 
12. The parties have the following investments which 
include tax shelter at Boston Inc., Fidelity Account, Dean 
Witter Account, and Copeland IRA. All of said investment is 
awarded to the Plaintiff as his sole and exclusive property. 
13. The parties have a voice mail system investment 
together with leases. The Defendant received money as 
inheritance from her father's estate. With that money she 
purchased a voice mail system. She is awarded this investment 
as her sole and exclusive property. The parties acquired a 
voice mail investment which now has a lease agreement. The 
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parties receive $395.00 and $195.00 per month from these 
leases. Commencing October 1, 1992, these amounts will be 
equally divided until the lease expires. Any assets in the 
voice mail system are awarded to the Defendant. 
14. The Defendant acquired an account at Zion's Bank and 
Universal Campus Credit Union from her father's estate. Said 
property is awarded to her as her inheritance, free from any 
interest from the Defendant. 
15. The Mountain America Credit Union Account will be 
awarded to the Defendant. 
16. Any and all other bank accounts are awarded to the 
parties as they are presently divided. 
17. The Plaintiff has been determined by the Court to 
be in arrears on his alimony during the temporary period and 
judgment has been entered against him. All of said amounts 
are considered satisfied. The Defendant's attorney will cause 
a satisfaction of judgment and release of garnishment to be 
sent to Plaintiff's employment and will release the amount 
currently in garnishment. 
18. Any amounts received by Defendant for rents or 
leases during the pendency of the divorce action are awarded 
to her as her property. 
19. Any and all other debts and obligations will be paid 
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by the party who incurred the particular debt or obligation. 
20. Each party is ordered to pay his or her own state 
and federal income taxes for the year 1992. 
21. The Plaintiff will immediately transfer the account 
at Key Bank and sign Quit Claim Deeds conveying the property 
above-stated to the Defendant on the date the stipulation is 
signed then the divorce can be finalized immediately. 
22. Each party is ordered to assume his or her own costs 
and attorney's fees incurred in this action. 
23. Each party is ordered to execute and deliver to the 
other such documents as are required to implement the 
provisions of the Decree of Divorce entered by the Court. 
DATED this 8th day of October, 1992. 
BY THE^OURT 
'HOWARD H. H2CETANI 
C o u r t Commiss ione r 
w"^ ^ / / 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
******** 
ROBERT H. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, RULING 
CIVIL NUMBER: 924400839 
vs. DECEMBER 7, 1992 
COMMISSIONER MAETANI 
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
******** 
The above-entitled matter came before the court commissioner 
for a default divorce on October 8, 1992 during which plaintiff was 
present and appeared pro se. The parties had entered into a 
Stipulation which was filed with the Court on October 9, 1992. The 
Decree Of Divorce and Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law were 
signed and entered on October 9, 1992. On or about October 13, 
1992 defendant filed a Release Of Garnishment and on October 15, 
1992 defendant also filed a Notice Of Entry Of Judgement. On or 
about November 19, 1992 plaintiff filed a Motion For A Change Of 
Venue And A Property Settlement Trial And A Request For A Hearing. 
On or about November 20, 1992 defendant filed a Response To Motion 
For Change Of Venue And A Property Settlement Trial And A Request 
For A Hearing. 
The court upon review of the documentation and the Court's 
tape record of the October 8, 1992 hearing and upon being advised 
in the premises, now recommends as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the plaintiff filed a Complaint For Divorce in the 
above-entitled matter on or about April 24, 1992. Defendant filed 
an Answer To Complaint For Divorce And Counterclaim or about April 
24, 1992. 
After much litigation over the temporary orders in effect 
during the pendency of this action, the parties entered into a 
Stipulation which was filed with the Court October 9, 1992. The 
Stipulation addressed the issues of alimony, division of real and 
personal property, and division of investments, retirement 
benefits, and marital debts. The parties stipulated specifically 
as the following issues: that the divorce would be granted on 
grounds of irreconcilable differences, that each party would 
relinquish alimony, that defendant would be awarded the real 
properties at 437 South 800 East, Orem and 789 East 1400 South, 
Or em, that defendant would be awarded the Key Bank account and 
would be responsible for the debts to Sid Gilbert, Lomas and 
Nettleton, Mardell Topham, and David Lambert, that defendant would 
be awarded one-half (%) of plaintiff's retirement or pension plan 
that were accumulated during the parties' marriage, that the 
investments with Boston, Inc., Fidelity Account, Dean Witter 
Account, and Copeland IRA would be awarded to plaintiff, that 
defendant would be awarded the voice mail system investment as her 
sole property and that proceeds from the voice mail investment with 
the lease agreement be divided equally until the expiration of the 
lease, that defendant be awarded the bank accounts at Zion's Bank, 
Universal Campus Credit Union, and Mountain America Credit Union, 
that defendant would enter a satisfaction of judgement for 
plaintiff's arrearages in temporary alimony, and that plaintiff 
would transfer the bank account at Key Bank and sign quit Claim 
deeds conveying the real property to defendant. (See Stipulation 
signed by parties on October 7, 1992 and filed with the Court on 
October 9, 1992). 
The Decree Of Divorce Of Divorce and Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions Of Law which incorporated the terms of the Stipulation 
were prepared by defendant's counsel, Marilyn Moody Brown, and 
signed and entered by the Court on October 9, 1992. 
2. That plaintiff filed his Motion For A Change Of Venue And 
A Property Settlement Trial And A Request For A Hearing on or about 
November 19, 1992 alleging that his signature on all divorce 
documents setting up the conditions of the divorce were obtained by 
lies, fraud, coercion and financial hardship. Plaintiff further 
alleges that the Court is biased by individuals appearing pro se 
and such bias constitutes coercion against the plaintiff and that 
the Court has violated the law by granting defendant total control 
over all the marital assets. 
The Court notes that plaintiff signed his Motion For a Change 
Of Venue And A Property Settlement Trial And A Request For A 
Hearing on October 7, 1992, the very same day that plaintiff signed 
the Stipulation between the parties governing the settlement of the 
disputed issues in this matter. 
3. Defendant alleges in her Response To Motion For A Change 
Of Venue And A Property Settlement Trial And A Request For A 
Hearing that plaintiff's allegations that the Court has somehow 
acted improperly are no different from the allegations plaintiff 
has made throughout the pendency of this matter. Defendant further 
points out that the Stipulation the parties entered into contained 
very specific provisions as to plaintiff acknowledging that he has 
obtained legal advice, that he has the right not to enter into the 
Stipulation, and that he is entering into the agreement of his own 
free will and is not action under the coercion or undue influence 
of anyone. See Paragraphs 25. through 32. of the Stipulation filed 
October 9, 1992. 
4. Under Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (1990), the Utah 
Court of Appeals has held that stipulations are conclusive and 
binding unless on timely notice and for good cause, relief is 
granted. See also Hialey v. McDonald, 685 P.2d 496 (Utah 1984). 
While contract theories such as bargain and waiver are inapplicable 
to the court's continuing jurisdiction over child custody and 
support, Gates v. Gates, 787 P.2d 1344 (Utah App. 1990), the Court 
finds that plaintiff freely bargained for and accented to the 
agreements entered into when the parties signed the Stipulation on 
October 7, 1992. 
The Court feels that plaintiff has produced insufficient proof 
to support his allegations that he was under such coercion or 
duress from either the defendant or the Court that he did not 
assert his rights at the time he entered into the Stipulation. The 
Court further notes that upon review of the Court's tape record of 
the default proceedings on October 8, 1992, that the Court 
questioned plaintiff as to his understanding of the Stipulation 
that parties had entered into and as to his agreement to be bound 
by such agreement. The Court notes that plaintiff assented to both 
his understanding of the Stipulation and his agreement to be bound 
by it in open court. 
Additionally, the Court further finds that plaintiff's claims 
that the Court is so biased towards to individuals representing 
themselves pro se as to be coercive toward those individuals to be 
unfounded and unsubstantiated. Instead, the Court often attempts 
to take precautions that individuals representing themselves pro se 
are not jeopardizing their legal rights and interests. The Court 
finds it disturbing that plaintiff would make such allegations in 
an attempt to circumvent agreements he freely entered into and that 
he is now unhappy with. 
Therefore, the court finds that the present arrangements 
between the parties concerning the issues resolved in the 
Stipulation filed with the Court on October 9, 1992 and 
incorporated into the Decree Of Divorce and Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions Of Law should continue and plaintiff's Motion For A 
Change Of Venue And A Property Settlement Trial And A Request For 
A Hearing is denied. 
Accordingly, the parties have ten (10) days from the date of 
this ruling to file a specific written objection with the clerk of 
the court. Regardless as to whether an objection is filed, counsel 
for the defendant is directed to prepare an appropriate order 
consistent with the aforementioned recommendation. 
DATED at Provo, Utah this T7 day of December, 1992. 
RECOMMENDED BY: 
cc: Robert H. Peterson 
Marilyn Moody Brown 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT T. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
CASE NUMBER: 924400839 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The Court has received two requests from the plaintiff both of which plaintiff has 
entitled, "Request for a Hearing Qualified Domestic Relations Order." The Court is not 
certain what he intends by such requests. However, treating them as motions for relief from 
the stipulation and decree entered in this case, the Court finds no justification for granting 
such relief. The Court has now ruled on all issues in this case. Plaintiffs present requests 
raise no issues that the Court has not already duly considered and disposed of. Accordingly, 
defendants requests are denied. 
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision 
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to the Court for signature. This 
memorandum decision has no effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
A O / 
cc: Marylin Moody Brown, Esq. 
Robert H. Peterson 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT T. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NUMBER: 924400839 
vs. 
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON, MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Defendant. 
Having received and fully considered plaintiff's Objection to the ruling of the 
Commissioner, dated December 7, 1992, the Court hereby overrules the objection. The 
Court finds that plaintiff has failed to establish that he signed the stipulation upon which the 
Commissioner's ruling was based as a result of fraud and coercion. Although the Court 
understands that plaintiff is not now, nor perhaps ever was, happy with the terms of the 
stipulation, plaintiff's representations are simply insufficient to overcome the presumption 
that plaintiff voluntarily entered into the stipulation by signing his name to an agreement 
which contained several affirmations that he was doing so of his own free will and choice, 
and without coercion. Because plaintiff has not claimed that the commissioner ruling is in 
any way inconsistent with the stipulation entered into by the parties, the Court must uphold 
the Decree of Divorce entered in this case and enforce the parties' stipulation according to its 
terms. 
Furthermore, plaintiffs "Motion for Change of Venue" is inappropriate and hereby 
denied. 
Counsel for Defendant is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision 
consistent with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval 
as to form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no 
effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
Dated this 13th day of January, 1993. 
cc: Marylin Moody Brown, Esq. 
Robert H. Peterson 
C- T i. -r — - r >oUR7 
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Marilyn Moody Brown, No. 4803 
TAYLOR, MOODY & THORNE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
2525 North Canyon Road 
Provo, Utah 84604 
Telephone: (801) 373-2721 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT T. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON REQUEST FOR A HEARING 
QUALIFIED DOMESTIC RELATIONS 
ORDER 
Civil No. 924400839 
The Court having received two requests from the Plaintiff both of which Plaintiff has 
entitled, "Request for a Hearing Qualified Domestic Relations Order." The Court is not certain 
what he intends by such requests. However, treating them as motions for relief from the 
stipulation and decree entered in this case, the Court finds no justification for granting such 
relief. The Court has now ruled on all issues in this case. Plaintiffs present requests raise no 
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issues that the Court has not already duly considered and disposed of. Defendants requests are 
denied. 
DATED this 3_ day of f ^ ^ r ^ ^ 1993. 
BY THE COUJ 
NOTICE TO PLAINTIFF 
TO: ROBERT T. PETERSON 
You will please take notice that the undersigned, Attorney for Plaintiff, will submit the 
above and foregoing Order on Request for Hearing Qualified Domestic Relations Order to the 
Honorable Ray M. Harding, Judge, for his signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days from 
the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to 
that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration of the State of Utah. 
$ davof'TYUoU ,1993. DATED this <^_ y of't ai-
MARILYN MOODY BROWN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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ROBERT H. PETERSON, Pro Se ) Jtf 
.5#e-=Seuth Main /3¥3 P^t #00 >&**%& 
Springville, Utah 84663 
(801) 225-8000 ext. 550 or 519 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT H. PETERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 924400839 
Judge Harding 
COMES NOW the plaintiff/appellant, Robert H. Peterson, pro se, 
and hereby gives notice of appeal of the Order of the Honorable 
Raymond M. Harding dated \ur*j ^ / ^  9 3 • 
This appeal is taken from the Fourth Judicial District Court 
in and for Utah County, State of Utah. This appeal is taken to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. 
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
DATED this 3D day of June, 1993 
(OBERT H. PETERSON 
Appearing Pro Se 
